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Abstract
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the health community faces the delicate balancing act 
of preserving public health by containing the outbreak, while at the same time insuring that 
individual health information remains protected.  Playing critical roles in both areas during 
the COVID-19 outbreak are communicable disease reporting systems.  Unfortunately, barriers 
to and delays in sharing health data often compromise the effectiveness of disease mitigation 
programs.  Data must be relevant, accurate, and timely, and communicable disease reporting 
systems are only as precise and useful as the data that is entered.  This essay examines both 
the successes and the failures of protected health information (PHI) data sharing, reviews the 
laws and rules governing PHI data sharing for first responders, determines whether the need 
exists for real-time sharing of PHI, and offers recommendations for future implementation.  In 
addition, it demonstrates that the health information currently available to the first responder 
community has led to a sense of security and confidence that is undeserved, in part because 
there is an absence of timely and accurate reporting of such information.  Policy and legislation 
updates must address the needs of both government and the private sector for accurate, timely 
information reporting by the state’s communicable disease reporting system. Health testing 
capabilities should be expanded and should produce accurate, timely results to accommodate 
the surge in testing that is necessary to identify the population’s infected members.
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Introduction
At the end of 2019, a Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Novel Coronavirus 2 (CoV), 
SARS-CoV-2, was identified as the cause of an outbreak in Wuhan, China.1  The disease, later 
named Coronavirus Disease 2019 or COVID-19, caused a global pandemic that has strained the 
balancing of an individual’s “right to privacy” and the public’s “right to know” in the effort to 
contain the spread of the virus.   COVID-19 is primarily thought to be spread by close contact 
with an infected person through the production of respiratory droplets, such as coughing, 
sneezing, or dialogue in close proximity.2  Considering that a significant majority of infected 
individuals are asymptomatic, this creates further challenges in addressing ways to contain the 
spread of the virus. 
The virus infection rate, incubation period, and methods of transmission create unique challenges 
to stopping the spread of COVID-19.  Law enforcement personnel and the first responder 
community, by the nature of their jobs, have a greater probability outside the health care 
environment to interact with infected persons.3  At the onset of this pandemic, guidance was 
released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in order to limit exposure, 
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including prevention measures, contact tracing, quarantine periods, and recommendations 
concerning information sharing for those who were infected by COVID-19.4  The recommendations 
for sharing information included surveillance, investigation, and intervention.
On March 24, 2020, the U.S Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR) issued guidance to address the emerging needs of first responders dealing with 
people infected with or exposed to COVID-19.5  This guidance specified that public health 
agencies may disclose Protected Health Information (PHI) to first responders in order to prevent 
the spread of COVID-19 without violating the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule.  Traditionally, federal and state laws allow for the sharing of 
PHI with law enforcement and other first responder entities for specifically enumerated reasons 
or post-exposure.
Since the issuance of the above-detailed guidance by HHS OCR on March 24, 2020, many states 
have implemented procedures for generating lists of individually identifiable health information 
for confirmed COVID-19 positive persons. However, the allowable sharing of PHI data varies 
from state to state, depending upon the specific state’s governance. For example, the State 
of New Jersey has authorized the generation of lists of identifiable health information of 
individuals who are confirmed COVID-19 positive.
This essay will examine both the successes and the failures of existing PHI data sharing, review 
the laws governing PHI data sharing for first responders, determine whether a need exists for 
real-time sharing of PHI, and make recommendations for future implementation.  
Laws and Regulations Governing PHI Data
There is no specific U.S. federal law regulating the protection of PHI on a national level.  
Instead, there is a complex combination of federal and state laws governing the collection, 
use, transmission, and disclosure of PHI.  In order to understand PHI, it is essential to examine 
its background.  PHI data is a subset of Personally Identifiable Information (PII).  PII is a term 
referring to information that is associated with or used to identify an individual.  Moreover, 
as defined by the Department of Homeland Security Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive 
PII published December 2017, “Sensitive PII” is a type of PII, which, if lost, compromised, 
or disclosed without authorization, may result in harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or 
unfairness to an individual. For example, Sensitive PII includes a name with medical information, 
social security number, date of birth, citizenship, or any combination, including details 
concerning addresses or family members.6
In order to analyze the use of PHI data by law enforcement and the first responder 
communities, it is essential to review the progression of laws and rules associated with the use 
of health data.  Central to this review is an examination of the restrictions and the protections 
of health data, both of which are covered by the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources 
Emergency Act and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). 7  
Together, both acts, which are codified in U.S. Code Title 42, and are also covered in Title 45 of 
the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, are the principal collective focus of this analysis.  
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A. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act
In 1990, the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act (the Ryan White Act) 
was enacted by Congress.8   The Ryan White Act provided funding, treatment resources, and 
awareness programs to combat the AIDS / HIV epidemic.  The initial enactment provided for 
post-exposure notification to first responders exposed to a bloodborne or airborne transmissible 
disease.  The Act was reauthorized in 2006 and again in 2009.  During the 2006 reauthorization, 
post-exposure notification was removed from the law.  However, it was subsequently restored 
to the law during the 2009 reauthorization.  The reauthorization of the Ryan White Act in 2009 
also included updates to add coverage of other communicable diseases, such as SARS-CoV, for 
which post-exposure notifications were approved.9   Enumerated in Table 1 is the updated CDC 
list requiring notification involving infectious diseases:10
Table 1: Updated CDC list requiring notification involving infectious diseases
1990 Initial List 2009 Reauthorization New Additions
• Diphtheria • Anthrax, cutaneous
• Hepatitis B •  Novel influenza A and other influenza 
strains with a pandemic severity index 
greater than or equal to 3
• HIV, including AIDS • Hepatitis C
• Tuberculosis • Measles
• Viral hemorrhagic fevers • Mumps
• Meningococcal disease • Pertussis
• Plague, pneumonic • Rubella






B. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
Prior to HIPAA, there were no standard security or privacy rules or other requirements for 
protecting PHI data.  HIPAA came to fruition approximately the same time that the health care 
industry migrated from a paper environment to electronic systems.  HIPAA applies to covered 
entities such as health care providers, health departments, and businesses associated with 
health data (e.g., labs and medical supply firms).  However, law enforcement agencies that are 
not involved in advanced medical processes are not considered covered entities under HIPAA. 
Two of the more significant objectives of HIPAA are the protection of an individual’s privacy 
and the security of health information in the digital environment.  HIPAA requires the Secretary 
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of HHS to develop and implement both privacy and security standards. These two standards 
are promulgated in the Privacy Rule and the Security Rule, respectively.  The rules establish 
replicable national standards for the protection of health information, as well as a set of 
national security standards for electronically transmitted or stored data.  HHS OCR is responsible 
for enforcement of both the Privacy and Security Rules, which authorize the imposition of 
civil penalties against violators.  Certain first responder agencies such as emergency services 
are considered covered entities when dealing with PHI and therefore are not exempt from 
unauthorized disclosures or careless actions with PHI data.   
An example of the enforcement of the above rules against first responders occurred on 
December 30, 2019, when HHS OCR fined West Georgia Ambulance, Inc., a provider of 
emergency medical services in Carroll County, Georgia, the sum of $65,000 for violations of 
HIPAA rules and noncompliance in securing PHI data.  Among the violations in question was one 
involving the loss of a laptop computer that contained approximately 500 records of patient 
data.  At the time, OCR Director Roger Severino stated, “all providers, large and small, need to 
take their HIPAA obligations seriously.”11
The Privacy Rule was created to balance the individual’s right to privacy with the ability to share 
PHI in certain circumstances.  As identified, the Privacy Rule created a national standard that 
insured an individual’s health information would remain private and protected but permitted 
sharing such information with covered entities in order to facilitate diagnosis or treatment.  
Under the Privacy Rule, and prior to the guidance released from HHS OCR regarding COVID-19 
on March 24, 2020, PHI data sharing with law enforcement agencies and personnel was only 
permitted under six conditions.12
The above referenced six conditions include disclosure by covered entities, as follows:
1. If requested by court orders, grand jury subpoena, or administrative request
2. To identify a suspect, fugitive, material witness, or missing person
3.  In response to a law enforcement official’s request for information about a victim or 
suspected victim of a crime
4.  To alert law enforcement of a person’s death, if the covered entity suspects that 
criminal activity caused the death 
5.  When in good faith, it is believed that protected health information is evidence of a 
crime that occurred on the covered entity’s premises 
6.  For an incident not occurring on the covered entity’s premises, when necessary to 
inform law enforcement about the commission and nature of a crime, the location 
of the crime or crime victim(s) of such an offense, and the identity, description, and 
location of the perpetrator of the crime13
Under the HIPAA Security Rule, covered entities are able to implement systems that are tailored 
to their specific facilities as long as they maintain the proper protection of patient information 
stored or transmitted electronically. Three types of security safeguards are outlined in the 
Security Rule, including administrative, physical, and technical safeguards.  This Security Rule 
requires the implementation of policies and procedures that comply with HIPAA, including 
protecting physical data, controlling access to the systems themselves, and providing encryption 
of data sent over open networks.  
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In 2013, the Omnibus Rule was added as an update to HIPAA regulations in order to strengthen 
privacy and security protections of covered entities.  This amendment includes addendums 
whereby the covered entity’s business associates and subcontractors are held to the same 
standards required in HIPAA, including the Privacy and Security Rules.14 
It is essential to have a grasp of existing federal laws in order to understand the permitted uses 
of PHI information sharing.  However, the mixture of federal and state laws complicates this 
legal analysis, adversely impacting the permissible sharing of PHI with law enforcement and the 
first responder communities.  Further research is warranted in order to understand the effect of 
PHI related laws on information sharing.
C. Synopsis 
The Ryan White Act forged the way for the sharing of PHI with the first responder community 
in a post-exposure incident, irrespective of medical privacy concerns.  HIPAA and the Omnibus 
Rule expand the sharing of PHI within the medical community and its sub-partners, which 
require the data.  Additionally, HIPAA exceeds PII security and sharing protocols in the 
requirements for organizations and sub-partners.  Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, both health 
care entities and sub-partners are subject to substantial legal liability for any breach caused by 
security shortfall in the storage, use, and transmission of PHI data.  
Nevertheless, HIPAA is a valuable framework, which insures that sensitive information does not 
“fall through the cracks” and that covered entities and their sub-partners provide the highest 
level of care, security, and confidentiality of medical information. It is noteworthy that health 
information privacy in the context of the legal framework does not govern information that 
does not contain PII, that is patient-generated, or that is in a nonregulated entity’s (e.g., Google, 
Apple) possession.15  
This includes the collection of health data by smartphone apps, wearable devices, and direct-to-
consumer testing companies.
COVID-19 PHI Data Sharing
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented challenge within the health community 
with respect to containing the outbreak.  In order to manage the pandemic, home quarantine, 
implementation of social distancing strategies, prohibitions against large public gatherings, 
testing (fixed and mobile), and innovative approaches to contact tracing have been implemented.  
To further, address this challenge, the sharing of health information among medical partners, 
research facilities, law enforcement, and first responder communities has become a key element 
in identifying both symptomatic and asymptomatic infected persons in order to contain the 
outbreak, while at the same time protecting the public from further exposure. 
COVID-19 PHI data includes specific information about an identifiable patient, test results, 
treatment, and the creation of COVID-19 positive patient and address lists.  Additionally, the data 
includes released COVID-19 reports aggregating confirmed cases or deaths concerning a specific 
region, county, town, or state, and the personal information of a patient, such as a home address.   
HHS OCR provided two specific scenarios that are relevant to the many covered entities on the 
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front lines of the pandemic. First, a covered entity provider may disclose a list of names and 
addresses of those individuals who have tested positive or received treatment for COVID-19 
to a dispatch center for use on a per-call basis. Second, a 911 call center that is designated 
as a covered entity may ask callers to answer COVID-19 screening questions and disclose the 
information received to law enforcement officers who are dispatched to the subject locations. In 
these scenarios, the ability to disclose this PHI allows the first responders and law enforcement 
officers to take extra precautions, such as the use of personal protective equipment (PPE).16,17  
State, county, and local health departments are capable of tracking COVID-19 positive test 
results through their respective communicable disease reporting systems.  An Associated 
Press article published on May 19, 2020, listed several states, including Colorado, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Dakota, which 
provide law enforcement officials with the names and addresses of COVID-19 patients. However, 
Wisconsin and Tennessee terminated sharing the COVID-19 data with law enforcement after 
privacy concerns were raised by the public and several special interest groups.18  The sharing 
of COVID-19 PHI varies across several states with regard to policy, laws, and, in some cases, 
involves signed memorandums of understanding.  
Typically, any COVID-19 data that is provided is flagged in computer-aided dispatch (CAD) 
systems so that responding officers can be alerted that there may be a positive infected person 
at the incident address.  The COVID-19 PHI is furnished so that extra precautions are taken when 
dealing with an incident at a specific address, and not as a pretext to refuse a call for service or 
to deny treatment to an infected person. 
Although sharing of COVID-19 PHI is legal under federal and state laws, several questions arise 
from the disclosure of such data.  These questions include:
• Whether the COVID-19 PHI sharing with law enforcement serves a purpose?
• Is the COVID-19 data disclosure to law enforcement accurate and timely?
•  In absence of testing capabilities, many positive individuals may not be tested, and 
given the possibility of asymptomatic COVID-19 persons, should first responders 
simply utilize universal precautions on all incidents during this pandemic, rather 
than rely on COVID-19 lists? 
•  Has COVID-19 PHI data sharing led to a false sense of security in first responders 
due to the lack of testing, delays in COVID-19 data aggregation, and the absence of 
timely reporting of positive COVID-19 persons?  
To further analyze these questions and the usage of PHI data for law enforcement, the 
procedures implemented in Bergen County, New Jersey for PHI disclosures and the policies 
drawn up for the use of PHI data in New Jersey next will be examined.  
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Bergen County COVID-19 DATA  
Sharing Analysis 
In New Jersey, public health reporting is mandated by state law, and reportable communicable 
diseases are identified in the New Jersey Statutes Annotated (N.J.S.A.), Section 26, Chapter 
4-1, and New Jersey Administrative Code (N.J.A.C.), Title 8, Chapter 57.  It is the responsibility 
of health care providers to notify the local health department where an infected patient 
resides when the presence of a communicable disease is determined.19  New Jersey utilizes a 
web-based system, the Communicable Disease Reporting and Surveillance System (CDRSS), 
by which public health partners statewide report and track incidents involving communicable 
diseases.  Hospitals and labs enter patient information, such as testing, results, and treatment.  
Public health officials are then able to conduct follow up investigations and contact tracing for 
patients who have tested positively for communicable diseases, such as COVID-19.20  Disclosures 
of confidential individual medical information mandated by the New Jersey Commissioner of 
Health are defined under New Jersey’s Emergency Health Powers Act, N.J.S.A. 26:13-1.21
Once a notification is received, and patient information is entered into CDRSS, the County Local 
Information Network and Communication System (LINCS) is engaged.  As stated by the New 
Jersey Department of Health, “LINCS is a system of public health professionals and electronic 
public health information that enhances the identification and containment of diseases and 
hazardous conditions which threaten civilization.”22  For the purpose of controlling the spread 
of the virus to the at-risk population, the New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH) empowers 
local Public Health Officers to share the names and addresses of individuals who have tested 
positive for COVID-19 with law enforcement agencies.  This information sharing was authorized 
in order to enable law enforcement officers across New Jersey to protect themselves better and 
more effectively use their limited supplies of PPE amid the COVID-19 pandemic.23
In order to secure the information that is shared and protect the privacy of the individuals 
affected, the NJDOH and the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office require Public Health Officers 
to follow specific steps for the disclosure of PHI.  Delineated in New Jersey Attorney General 
Directive 2020-1 are the established procedures for obtaining COVID-19 PHI from health 
officials, the process for sharing such information with law enforcement and others, and the 
limitations on its use.24  New Jersey Attorney General Directive 2020-1 was issued on March 19, 
2020, revised on March 27, 2020, and again revised on April 11, 2020.  This directive established 
the County Prosecutor’s Office (CPO) as the primary conduit to streamline the process by which 
COVID-19 PHI is shared in New Jersey.  Requirements of the directive are outlined as follows:
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•  CPOs will receive COVID-19 PHI from their County LINCS agency, including name and 
address information.
•  The CPO will provide a list of specific names and addresses associated with an 
agency’s jurisdiction so that the file can be maintained in a CAD system.  This will be 
completed in accordance with the following procedure: 
•  If a county-wide CAD system exists, the list will be flagged by name and address in 
the county system.
   •  If a local agency operates its own CAD system, then the list is provided to a single 
point of contact who will flag the address.
n   The assigned person is not permitted to share the list with any other 
persons and will be responsible solely for adding the flags in the CAD.
n   The assigned person must ensure the confidentiality and security of the list.
•  COVID-19 PHI will be transmitted in protected, encrypted, and/or secure emails, or, 
if hand-delivered, must be similarly protected.
•  COVID-19 PHI will be deleted when the County LINCS officer or CPO determines 
an individual should be cleared or upon a declaration that the public emergency is 
concluded. 
•  A person is considered cleared when 30 days have passed from the date of their 
positive test and must then be removed from the CAD.
•  COVID-19 information contained in the CAD system will be utilized solely for the 
limited purpose of protecting the health and safety of first responders. 
•  No law enforcement officer may use COVID-19 information as a basis for refusing 
any call for service.
•  No law enforcement officer may require individuals to identify themselves as 
COVID-19 positive or to quarantine when seeking assistance from law enforcement.
•  No individuals or addresses can be flagged in CAD systems unless obtained through 
this procedure from the County LINCS officer or CPO.25
The Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (BCPO) is the designated CPO for Bergen County, 
New Jersey, and oversees 72 law enforcement agencies with approximately 2,700 sworn law 
enforcement officers.  Bergen County is one of New Jersey’s twenty-one counties and has the 
largest population with approximately one million residents.  The initial outbreak of COVID-19 in 
New Jersey occurred in Bergen County on March 4, 2020.  Since the onset of the outbreak, Bergen 
County has led the state in confirmed positive cases, as well as deaths as a result of COVID-19.  
As of June 29, 2020, Bergen County had 19,423 confirmed COVID-19 cases, whereas the state 
had a total of 171,272 cases.  Bergen County peaked on April 10, 2020, after experiencing a 
2,585-case increase, and the state peaked on April 14, 2020, with a 4,059-case increase.    The 
following table (Figure 1) shows the progression of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Bergen County 
relative to the entire state: 26 
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Figure 1:  New Jersey COVID Cases  Source: NJ Department of Health
Beginning on March 19, 2020, the BCPO started a weeklong pilot program to produce daily 
name and address lists of positive COVID-19 persons.  After completion of the initial pilot, 
the plan was authorized to continue for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic.  On March 
28, 2020, Bergen County Prosecutor Mark Musella issued Directive 2020-6, implementing 
procedures to share PHI data with law enforcement officers in Bergen County that were outlined 
in New Jersey Attorney General Directive 2020-1.  The Prosecutor’s Directive additionally 
specified that Bergen County law enforcement officers were not permitted to request that any 
person publicly identify as COVID-19 positive or quarantine when seeking police assistance, nor 
to provide any public notice of COVID-19 positive or quarantine status, nor record any voluntary 
disclosures of positive or quarantined individuals in CAD systems that were not obtained 
through the outlined procedure.27
As New Jersey is a home-rule state, only 13 of the 72 law enforcement agencies are able to 
access the county-wide CAD system.  In order to accommodate the other 59 agencies, the BCPO 
created a Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) server with two-factor authentication required 
in order to transmit PHI data to these agencies.  Each agency designated a single point of 
contact responsible for downloading a list produced daily by the BCPO from confirmed cases of 
COVID-19.  The list generated by the BCPO is provided through a daily report function in CDRSS.  
Only confirmed positive names and addresses are extracted from the system and then further 
broken out by jurisdiction so that such limited information may be shared among the 72 law 
enforcement agencies based on their geographical locations.    
New Jersey reports that as of June 28, 2020, 1,403,984 of approximately 9,241,900 New Jersey 
residents, or roughly 15% of the state’s population, have been tested.  With an incubation 
period of up to 14 days for COVID-19 and a median time of 4-5 days from exposure to the onset 
of symptoms, the low percentage tested presents serious challenges to public health and first 
responders.28  Furthermore, in the public disclosure by the Bergen County Executive on June 26, 
2020, it was reported that of the 19,283 confirmed cases in the county, approximately 799 cases 
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had no address information associated with the record.  During the daily reports provided to the 
public by the Bergen County Executive, the number of cases without an address record has varied 
from 600 to as high as 890.29  The high number of unknown addresses adds to the misperception 
of accuracy in the lists of COVID-19 confirmed positive individuals because this number represents 
individuals who have tested positive but are not associated with a residence. Consequently, these 
individuals are not be part of any COVID-19 list provided to law enforcement. 
The NJDOH and New Jersey Commissioner of Health Judith Persichilli raised additional concerns 
on delays in reporting of COVID-19 confirmed positive individuals.   At a press conference held 
on March 27, 2020, Commissioner Persichilli stated that “the backlog of testing due to the 
overwhelming volume of requested tests is being reported as high as seven days. That’s the time 
between having the test specimen collected and getting a result.”30  Then again, on July 13, 2020, 
Commissioner Persichilli further reported that, “in New Jersey testing turnaround time has been 
steadily increasing for three weeks due to national demand and a national supply shortage. Our 
average turnaround time is now more than five days when previously, it had been two to four.”31  
This delay in testing directly impacts the CDRSS system and the entry of a COVID-19 confirmed 
positive individuals in the system.  The data extracted from CDRSS and then provided to law 
enforcement only includes confirmed positive individuals who are placed on the list.   
Part of the appendix of New Jersey Attorney General Directive 2020-1 was Exhibit B, labeled 
“Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQ).  This document provided by the NJDOH expanded on 
additional possible delays for CDRSS entries.  Further adding to delayed reporting, Exhibit B - 
FAQ outlined several reasons why individuals who test positive may not be on the lists provided 
to law enforcement, as noted below:32
• Delays in getting cases entered in CDRSS, such as faxed reports of individuals.
•  Delays in getting the CDRSS case assigned to a Local Health Department (LHD) for 
verification.  The LHD has to manually review cases before confirmation of the 
individual in the system.
•  Delays in getting the CDRSS case assigned to the correct LHD.  As an example, some 
individuals provided a PO Box and not a residential address during testing.
•  Delays in getting the current address of an individual who did not have one listed in 
CDRSS.
• Inability to obtain the current address of the individual.
•  The Individual’s current address does not match the individual’s driver’s license or 
other documented legal address.  The LHD does not have access to law enforcement 
systems or databases and therefore, has to rely on the individual’s self-reporting or 
disclosure during the testing process.
•  Lastly, conflicting reports about the individual from different sources which list 
separate addresses.
In light of the potential of individuals to be asymptomatic for up to 14 days, the delays in 
reporting positive patients up to seven days, compounded with LHD delays in confirming 
addresses, present significant challenges in publishing timely COVID-19 confirmed positive lists.  
Furthermore, the limited testing of individuals adversely affects the value of PHI data sharing.  
Timely reporting and greater testing capabilities are needed in order to reflect the threat 
environment for infected people accurately.  Law enforcement and first responder personnel 
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need to rely on universal precautions when responding to such incidents, as data may not 
be accurately reflected in COVID-19 lists or the persons involved may not have been tested.  
Additionally, while the assignment of a single point of contact at a law enforcement agency was 
implemented in order to secure the PHI data, there exists a potential that data entry into CAD 
systems can further be delayed depending on work schedules or remote computer access. 
Bergen County Directives and Quarantined Officer Statistics 
To further examine the benefit of sharing PHI data with law enforcement officers, it is similarly 
important to review the policies and procedures implemented to prevent further spread of 
COVID-19 in the law enforcement community.  The Bergen County Prosecutor, under the 
authority established in N.J.S.A. 2A:158-5, issued several directives to all law enforcement 
agencies in Bergen County for the response to, and preparation for the COVID-19 pandemic.  
To limit the exposure of law enforcement officers in the county and to further the 
implementation of PHI sharing as outlined in New Jersey Attorney General Directive 2020-1, the 
Bergen County Prosecutor issued the following directives:33
•  Bergen County Prosecutor’s Directive 2020-2 requiring law enforcement agencies 
must take all reasonable precautions to prevent the contracting and spread of 
COVID-19 virus, issued on March 16, 2020.34
•  Bergen County Prosecutor’s Directive 2020-3 providing additional direction for 
procedures that law enforcement agencies may take to minimize the spread of the 
COVID-19 virus to staff and public, issued on March 18, 2020.35
•  Bergen County Prosecutor’s Directive 2020-5 requiring all law enforcement 
employment for private entities must generally cease during the present state of 
emergency. Furthermore, every Bergen County law enforcement executive must 
implement a written plan to allocate law enforcement and civilian personnel to 
ensure minimal contact among staff, issued on March 23, 2020.36
The directives mentioned above were issued in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19  
and conserve workforce resources should an outbreak occur in a law enforcement agency 
within the county.  The directives issued to law enforcement agencies in Bergen County 
mandated the following:
• Agency personnel may not visit the department while off duty without permission.
• Agency personnel who can practically work remotely are permitted to do so.
•  The Agency administration shall implement scheduling that facilitates no contact or 
overlapping shifts.
•  Agency personnel who are ordered to quarantine, test positive or report sick shall 
remain home.
•  Agency personnel should, at a minimum, disinfect workstation equipment and 
vehicle interiors at the start of the shift.
•  Agency administration is to cancel off duty job assignments or extra duties that are 
not emergencies.
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, New Jersey implemented daily press conferences to provide 
updates to residents on the prevention and response measures.  These regular conferences 
included New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy, Health Commissioner Judith Persichilli, New Jersey 
State Police Superintendent Colonel Patrick Callahan, and various other government officials as 
needed.  For this analysis, we reviewed three of the daily press conferences in which Colonel 
Callahan provided disclosures of law enforcement officers statewide who tested positive for 
COVID-19 or were ordered to self-quarantine due to symptoms or exposure.   Table 2 illustrates 
the number of such reported officers on March 31, 2020, April 7, 2020, and April 13, 2020, and 
provides a comparison with Bergen County’s reporting during the same time period.









March 31, 202037 383 3,081 3,464 34 130 164
April 7, 202038 562 2,941 3,503 73 125 198
April 13, 202039 645 2,310 2,955 84 111 195
As reported by Colonel Callahan, New Jersey has approximately 36,000 law enforcement 
officers statewide, based on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniformed Crime Reporting 
numbers.40  Of this number, Bergen County represents approximately 2,700 law enforcement 
officers in the state. Utilizing the data contained in Table 2, the New Jersey statewide 
percentage of law enforcement officers testing positive or quarantined was greater than that in 
Bergen County.  The data indicates that statewide the total percentage of officers who tested 
positive or were quarantined was 9.63% on March 31, 2020, 9.73% on April 7, 2020, and 8.2% 
on April 13, 2020.  During this same time period, the data indicates that in Bergen County, the 
total percentage of officers who test positive or were quarantined was 6.07% on March 31, 
2020, 7.33% on April 7, 2020, and 7.22% on April 13, 2020.  It is important to understand the 
limitations in the data, that is, utilizing an approximate number of officers statewide and, in 
addition, agencies underreporting officers who tested positive or were quarantined.
As previously noted, Bergen County has had the highest amount of confirmed cases in the 
state since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, yet compared to statewide numbers, a lesser 
percentage of positive or quarantined officers.  While there is no conclusive proof, the data 
presented does suggest that procedures implemented for law enforcement agencies in Bergen 
County assisted in reducing the exposure of officers.  This is in addition to CDC guidance for 
social distancing, face coverings, disinfecting and monitoring personal health.
 
Recommendations
As delineated in this research, several recommendations are identified for future pandemic 
planning, mitigation, and remediation regarding PHI data sharing to protect law enforcement 
and first responder communities.  Fundamental to the value of PHI Data sharing with law 
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enforcement is that the data must be relevant, accurate, and timely.  Policy and legislation 
updates should address the need of both government and private sectors for accurate, 
timely reporting in the state’s communicable disease reporting system.  Additionally, testing 
capabilities must be expanded to accommodate the surge of testing required to identify 
infected members of the population accurately.  
The myriad of federal and state laws covering HIPAA and PHI data present challenges in our 
existing legal framework.  Agencies must be educated in their roles and responsibilities when 
it comes to receiving, disclosing, and storing PHI data.  The expansion of training in the area of 
PHI, PII, and data security must be implemented in the law enforcement community.  As noted 
in Bergen County’s example, proactive directives to address officer safety must be implemented 
globally without regard for traditional shift structure and operation arrangements.  Planning 
and implementation of officer safety policies will help prevent further diminished workforce 
potentials.  If training and security protocols are appropriately implemented, the reporting system 
does not have to rely on a single point of contact, and improved timely reporting will occur.   Lastly, 
regardless of data sharing and identification of COVID-19 confirmed positive individuals, universal 
safety protections must be implemented, and PPE utilized when appropriate.
Conclusion
In a public health emergency, law enforcement and the first responder community require 
additional safeguards so that they can continue to do their jobs safely, effectively and efficiently.  
As a result of a public health emergency, expanded duties may develop to mitigate the public 
health crisis.  The COVID-19 pandemic presented this challenge and produced unprecedented 
responsibilities for law enforcement.  Balancing law enforcement resources with new 
responsibilities and everyday service demands is a formidable distinctive challenge.  Resources 
can quickly become overwhelmed or absorbed.  Still, it is essential to protect law enforcement 
personnel; otherwise, the health risks of continuing to report to work will become too great for 
both them and their families.
Achieving a balance between the need to protect individual health information and the need 
to protect public health is the paramount challenge.  Agencies must work together in order 
to achieve the common goals of health and safety.  Communicable disease reporting systems 
play a critical role during widespread outbreaks.  Impediments to, and delays in data sharing 
may compromise the effectiveness of mitigation programs.  Without accurate and timely 
data sharing, the potential exists to create a false sense of security.  Crucial to the mitigation 
process is efficiently collaborating cross-sector in order to develop and share knowledge, and 
thereby prevent any worsening of the public health crisis.  The ability of law enforcement to 
respond effectively to any emergency, whether it is a public health crisis or otherwise, depends 
principally upon its preparedness. The creation of a unified framework for sharing data is useful 
as an essential step in addressing the effective response to the challenges we currently face.  
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